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1. INTRODUCTION
The State Environmental Policy Act of 19711 is the State
of Washington's most pervasive environmental law. In fact, a
strong case can be made that SEPA is Washington's most per-
vasive law of any kind2 because SEPA authority overlays and
supplements all other state statutory authority.3  SEPA estab-
lishes broad environmental purposes and policies for the State
of Washington4 and requires all policies, regulations, and laws
of the State to be interpreted in accordance with the policies of
SEPA.' In its earliest SEPA decisions, the Washington
1. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C (1989) (1971 Wash. Laws ex.s.ch. 109) (hereinafter
"SEPA").
2. See R. SETrLE, THE WASHINGTON STATE ENvIRoNMNTAL PoucY Acr. A
LEGAL AND PoLIcY ANALYsis 1-4 (1987).
3. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(1) (1989); Eastlake Community Council v.
Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 490, 513 P.2d 36, 46 (1973).
4. The general policies of SEPA are set out at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2)
(1989), which provides as follows:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the state of Washington and all agencies of the
state to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of state policy, to improve and coordinate plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the state and its citizens may:
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive,
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences;
(d) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage;
(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;
and
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
5. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030; Eastlake Community Council, 82 Wash. 2d at
490, 513 P.2d at 46.
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Supreme Court recognized SEPA as "a legislative mandate of
the ecological ethic' 6 and has generally given SEPA a broad
and liberal interpretation. Thus, SEPA potentially affects vir-
tually everything done by local governments and other agen-
cies of state government.
Procedurally, SEPA requires government agencies to
determine and analyze a proposal's probable significant envi-
ronmental impacts.7 The term "agency" means almost every
unit of state or local government that makes decisions or takes
actions that might significantly affect the environment.8 This
includes, but is not limited to, such diverse agencies as sewer
districts, school districts, city and county councils, boundary
review boards, and hearing examiners. "Proposals" include not
only actions that the agency itself plans to undertake, but also
any actions proposed by applicants seeking agency approvals.9
Building permit applications and subdivision plat applications
are typical of this latter type of proposal. When the probable
impacts of a proposal cross the threshold of environmental sig-
nificance, SEPA requires the agency to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement l to inform agency action on the
proposal."
The first few judicial decisions under SEPA tended to
focus on whether SEPA even applied to the matter in ques-
tion.'2 Most of the later decisions were concerned with
whether an EIS was required 13 or whether a prepared EIS was
6. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 117, 508 P.2d 166, 171
(1973) (the first Washington Supreme Court decision to construe SEPA).
7. "Significant" as used in SEPA means a reasonable likelihood of more than a
moderate impact on environmental quality. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-794 (1989);
see Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash.
2d 267, 276-78, 552 P.2d 674, 679-80 (1976).
8. See WAH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-714. Noteworthy exclusions include the state
legislature and judiciary.
9. See WASH. ADiN. CODE § 197-11-784.
10. Hereinafter "EIS". The content and preparation of the EIS are subject to a
substantial body of regulations. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-400 to -460 (1989).
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c); It should be noted that SEPA
contains a large number of exceptions to its operation. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 43.21C.035-.037; WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-800 to -890; see generally, Rodgers,
The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33, 44-47 (1984).
12. E.g., Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973); Stempel
v. Dept. of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
13. E.g., Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977); Norway
Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674
(1976); Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wash. App. 405, 568
P.2d 818 (1977).
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adequate.1 4 As the law has become more settled, litigation over
procedural compliance with SEPA has become less frequent.
This is largely the result of new statutory amendments enacted
in 1977 and 198315 and the SEPA Rules adopted in 1984.16
Accordingly, in recent years, judicial attention has increasingly
turned to challenges of agency substantive SEPA authority.17
SEPA is an integral part of the substantive decision-mak-
ing of agencies and, as such, interjects an element of environ-
mental discretion into the substance of agency decisions.'"
SEPA specifically authorizes agencies to impose conditions
upon or, more dramatically, to deny a proposal completely on
the basis of that proposal's adverse environmental impacts. 19
Under current law, an agency may impose reasonable, feasible
conditions upon a proposal only to mitigate specific adverse
environmental impacts identified in an environmental docu-
14. E.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980); Cheney v.
City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976).
15. 1977 Wash. Laws ex.s.ch. 278; 1983 Wash. Laws ch. 117 (both codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.21C).
The requirements of these amendments provide specific procedural rules and
safeguards for the exercise of SEPA denial authority and clarify, but do not limit,
prior case law. See WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, TEN YEARS' ExPERIENcE WITH
SEPA, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLIcY, at 38-39 (1983)
("SEPA is more than a disclosure law and . .. grants agencies authority over public
and private proposals. This corresponds with existing case law ......
16. Codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11 (1989).
17. Five of the eight published appellate opinions on substantive SEPA have been
decided since 1986: Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765
P.2d 264 (1988); Nagatani Bros. v. Skagit County Bd. of Comm'rs., 108 Wash. 2d 477,
739 P.2d 696 (1987); Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. App. 755,
745 P.2d 1328 (1987); West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742
P.2d 1266 (1987), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1989) ("West Main II"); Prisk v.
City of Poulsbo, 46 Wash. App. 793, 732 P.2d 1013 (1987).
The three earlier substantive SEPA cases were Dep't of Natural Resources v.
Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979); Polygon Corp. v. City of
Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978); Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. App.
410, 618 P.2d 1030 (1980).
A ninth substantive SEPA case was recently decided by the Washington Court of
Appeals, Division Two, on May 11, 1989, but the court subsequently withdrew its
opinion and affirmed the superior court in an unpublished opinion. The case is
currently before the Washington Supreme Court on petition for review. Levine v.
Jefferson County, 54 Wash. App. 88, 772 P.2d 528 (1989), opinion withdrawn (January
24, 1990), aff'd, 57 Wash. App. 1002 (1990), petition for review granted, Wash. Sup. Ct.
No. 57059-1 (June 5, 1990).
See Wilson, The SEPA Death Penalty: Project Denial Under SEPA's Substantive
Authority, LAND USE IN THE AGE OF GRiDLOCK, THE CONTINUING EDUCATION COMM.
OF THE WASH. STATE BAR Ass'N at 7-3 (1989).
18. See Polygon Corp. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660 (1989).
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ment.2° An agency may deny a proposal only if that proposal
will result in significant adverse environmental impacts identi-
fied in an EIS and if reasonable mitigation measures will not
mitigate the identified impacts.2 ' Both conditions and denials
must be based on policies formally adopted by the agency as a
basis for exercising substantive SEPA authority.22 Two recent
Washington decisions have raised the question of what consti-
tutes a proper substantive SEPA denial of an otherwise con-
forming building permit or plat application and have helped to
draw the line between proper and improper denials under sub-
stantive SEPA.2 s
West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue' (hereinafter "West Main
I") concerned the Bellevue City Council's denial of a proposal
to construct a large residential, retail and office complex. The
proposal was permissible under the applicable zoning, but the
Council denied building permit approval under its SEPA
authority. Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals
upheld the Council's denial. 5
The second case, Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King
County,2 6 concerned the King County Council's SEPA-based
denial of a subdivision plat application. Here again, the propo-
sal conformed to all applicable plat regulations,' but the
county denied the application under its substantive SEPA
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660 (1989)
(Conditions may be based on an EIS but are more frequently based on an
environmental checklist or determination of nonsignificance (DNS)).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. AnMsi. CODE § 197-11-060 (1989)
(Denials must be based on a final or supplemental EIS, not a draft EIS).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660 (1989).
23. SEPA's substantive authority allows agencies to condition as well as to deny
proposals. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060. This Comment analyzes only SEPA denials.
Similar issues are involved when substantive SEPA authority is used to condition
proposals. However, the conditioning of proposals raises several difficult, additional
questions: What is a reasonable mitigating measure? When is the mitigation capable
of being accomplished? When does a condition become so severe as to amount to a
denial? What are the limits of the requirement that conditions may be imposed only
to the extent attributable to the identified adverse impacts?
24. 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009
(1989).
25. Id.
26. 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264 (1988).
27. See WASH. REv. CODE § 58.17.110 and .140 (1989). When agencies approve
subdivision plat applications, unlike building permits, they have the power to inquire
into and require appropriate provisions for the public health, safety and general
welfare. This must be done within a 90-day period unless an EIS is required. In
Cougar Mountain the issues before the court involved the council's SEPA discretion,
not any discretion the county had under § 58.17.140.
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authority. However, in Cougar Mountain, the Washington
Supreme Court overturned the Council's denial.28
This Comment seeks to answer the question raised by
West Main II and Cougar Mountain of what procedural
processes and substantive policies may be used in SEPA-based
denials. After examining the nature of substantive SEPA
authority and the relationship between substantive SEPA and
Washington's vested rights doctrine, the Comment will discuss
West Main II and Cougar Mountain and will argue that the
two cases are consistent. It will then provide an informative
assessment of the current limits of substantive SEPA author-
ity. The Comment concludes by suggesting the following legis-
lative or judicial changes in SEPA law: earlier vesting of
SEPA policies, greater incorporation of environmental con-
cerns into regulatory codes, and restrictions on the content of
agency SEPA policies. These changes would create more cer-
tainty for property owners, but at the same time, would retain
sufficient flexibility for local governments using SEPA to con-
trol the environmental impacts of land use decisions.
II. THE NATURE OF SUBSTANTIVE SEPA AUTHORITY
The Environmental Impact Statement is the heart of
SEPA's procedural mandate to provide agency decision-makers
with full environmental information.2 The EIS is also the
basis for agency denials of proposals under substantive SEPA
authority.3 0 SEPA requires preparation of an EIS only for pro-
posed non-exempt 3 ' major actions 2 that would significantly
28. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 743, 765 P.2d at 265.
29. See Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 68, 510
P.2d 1140, 1146 (1973).
30. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060(1); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-60(b).
Note that an EIS is not necessary for an agency to impose conditions upon proposals
under substantive SEPA. Conditions may be imposed upon the basis of any
environmental document prepared pursuant to SEPA, most commonly an
Environmental Checklist or a DNS. WASH. REV. CODE. § 43.21C.060.
31. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c); It should be noted that SEPA
contains a large number of exceptions to its operation. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 43.21C.035-.037; WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-800 to -890; see generally, Rodgers,
The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33, 44-47 (1984).
32. "Major action" was first construed as an action that is discretionary and non-
duplicative. E.g., Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wash. 2d 475,
489-90, 513 P.2d 36, 46 (1973). The 1984 SEPA Rules have made it clear that "major
action" means only an action likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact
and that "major" has no meaning independent of "significant." WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-11-764.
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affect the environment. An action significantly affects the
environment whenever a greater than moderate effect on the
quality of the environment is a reasonably probable result of
the action.34
Having recognized a clear legislative intent that all agen-
cies of state government undertake full consideration of envi-
ronmental values and consequences, the courts have set this
threshold requirement rather low and given SEPA a broad and
vigorous construction.' In keeping with this policy, no partic-
ular quantum of evidence is required to support the finding of
an adverse impact,36 and a wide variety of impacts to both the
natural environment and the built environment may be consid-
ered.37  Thus, SEPA undertakes to insure full disclosure and
consideration of environmental values, without mandating a
particular substantive result.'
There was some debate after SEPA was first enacted3 9
about the extent to which agencies could make substantive
decisions based upon the environmental information disclosed
by the EIS.4° The Washington Supreme Court foreclosed this
debate and unequivocally recognized substantive SEPA author-
33. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(c).
34. WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-794; Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 358,
552 P.2d 175, 181 (1976); Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King
County, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 276-78, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976).
35. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030; Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash. 2d 78,
82, 566 P.2d 712, 715 (1977); Norway Hill, 87 Wash. 2d at 277, 552 P.2d at 680; Eastlake,
82 Wash. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46.
36. Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. App. 410, 414, 618 P.2d 1030, 1033 (1980).
37. See WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-444 (setting out an exclusive but broad list of
the elements of the natural environment and the built environment that should be
considered in EIS preparation); see also Buchsieb/Danard, Inc. v. Skagit County, 99
Wash. 2d 577, 579, 663 P.2d 487, 488 (1983) (traffic impacts, incompatibility with nearby
airport land use, surface water drainage problems, impacts on county sewer services,
inadequate county revenues to provide public services); Skagit County v. Dep't of
Ecology, 93 Wash. 2d 742, 749-80, 613 P.2d 115, 119-20 (1980) (impact of project as a
precedent, cumulative impact of the present project plus following projects would be
significant); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 69-70, 578 P.2d 1309, 1315
(1978) (aesthetics, view blockages, out-of-scale with surrounding neighborhood,
increased traffic and noise, trend to more intense land use); West Main II, 49 Wash.
App. 513, 521-22, 742 P.2d 1266, 1271 (1987), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1989)
(obstruction of public and private views, impact on a historically and culturally
important area, excessive bulk and scale as compared to surrounding area, increased
traffic and air pollution, shadow effects); Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. App. 410,
415, 618 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1980) (potential pressure to alter surrounding land use,
aesthetics of placing a warehouse in a residential setting).
38. See, e.g., Norway Hill, 87 Wash. 2d at 272-73, 552 P.2d at 677.
39. 1971 Wash. Laws ex.s.ch. 109 § 6. (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C).
40. See Settle, supra note 2, at 224-32.
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ity in the 1978 decision of Polygon Corp. v. Seattle.4' In Poly-
gon, the City of Seattle denied on SEPA grounds a developer's
permit application to construct an apartment building. The
proposal conformed to the city zoning code and the permit
would have been granted as of right prior to the enactment of
SEPA. The court held that SEPA validly delegates a discre-
tionary power that overlays even the purely ministerial func-
tion of permit issuance.'
Under the current SEPA statute and rules, denials must
be based on local agency SEPA policies that are adopted by the
agency and incorporated in regulations, plans, or codes.43
These policies must be formally designated by the agency as
possible bases for the exercise of SEPA authority44 and must
be in effect when the DNS or DEIS is issued.45 The statute
and rules, however, give no guidance as to the content of local
agency SEPA policies, and thus far, the courts have given
agencies broad discretion to determine the substance of their
SEPA policies.
When an agency exercises its substantive SEPA authority
to deny a proposal, it must make written findings that state the
decision and specify the SEPA policy bases for the denial. 4
These findings must show (1) that the proposal would result
in significant adverse impacts identified in the EIS, and
(2) that reasonable mitigation measures would be insufficient
to avoid the identified impacts.47 These requirements have
helped to regularize and give structure to the SEPA denial
process, but important questions remain. These questions
include the extent of specificity in the agency's written find-
ings; the detail required in the discussion of mitigation meas-
41. 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
42. Id. at 64, 578 P.2d at 1313.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(a); see
Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 752, 765 P.2d 264, 269-70
(1988).
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(a); see
Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 752, 765 P.2d 264, 269-70
(1988).
45. WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(a) (DNS is the threshold determination of
non-significance. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-734. DEIS is the draft environmental
impact statement, which is prepared at an early stage under agency authority and
circulated to other agencies with jurisdiction or expertise for comment. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-455.)
46. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(b); see Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at
755, 765 P.2d at 271.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(f).
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ures; whether limitations exist on the types of policies that
may permissibly be adopted as agency SEPA policies; whether
SEPA policies may be so broad as to be unconstitutionally
vague; whether an agency may be allowed to adopt SEPA poli-
cies which are contradictory; and whether substantive due pro-
cess imposes fairness limits on the denial process.
These questions are especially important in the area of pri-
vate land development regulation because one of substantive
SEPA's most important and most controversial uses has been
the condition and denial of subdivision and plat applications.
To date, all of the substantive SEPA cases to reach the appel-
late courts have involved the conditioning or denying of build-
ing permits or plat applications by local government agencies.
SEPA has been so important, and so frequently utilized, in this
manner because of Washington's rather peculiar vested rights
doctrine. Therefore, an understanding of the vested rights doc-
trine is essential to an understanding of how SEPA fits into
Washington's system of land use regulation.
III. WASHINGTON'S VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND
SUBSTANTIVE SEPA AUTHORITY
The State of Washington has long held to a distinctly
minority position, shared by only a few other states, as to when
the right to develop land vests. In most states, zoning and land
use regulations may be changed up until a permit is approved
and substantial reliance upon that permit has occurred."
Under the Washington doctrine, a developer who files a timely
and complete49 application obtains a vested right to have that
48. See Allenbach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 197, 676 P.2d 473, 475
(1984); R. SETTLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRoNMENTAL LAW 40 (1984)
("[The overwhelming majority rule is that development is not immune from
subsequently adopted regulations until a building permit has been obtained and
substantial development has occurred in reliance on the permit. There is variation
among courts adhering to the majority rule in its application. What constitutes
substantial development varies significantly. Emphasizing that the public interest is
subverted if developers may race to obtain building permits under zoning regulations
which are about to be changed, the majority rule does not permit rights to vest against
regulations which were pending before local decision makers at the time of application
for the building permit, its receipt, or substantial development."); see generally, Note,
Washington's Zoning Vested Rights Doctrine, 57 WASH. L. REv. 139 (1981).
49. See Valley View Industrial Park v. Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182
(1987); Mercer Enters v. Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 611 P.2d 1237 (1980) (The
Washington courts recognize a limited exception to the completeness requirement
where the permit applicant is acting diligently in good faith and the municipality
frustrates those efforts).
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application processed according to the zoning and land use
ordinances in effect at the date of application. 0 Even where
there are new land use regulations pending, developers in
Washington are allowed to "fix" the rules that govern their
development by making a timely and complete application.5'
The legal basis for this doctrine has been less than lucidly
articulated in the decisions.2 One justification for the rule is
to provide a bright line for administrative convenience and
efficiency.53 The other justifications for the rule spring from
notions of fundamental fairness:54 the vesting doctrine pro-
tects developers' valuable development rights- from the
potentially fluctuating policies of local government. Further,
the vesting doctrine allows landowners and developers to plan
their conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal conse-
quences.'s A vested right does not, however, guarantee the
right to build; the right merely establishes the ordinances with
which the developer must comply. Regulatory changes occur-
ring after the time of vesting will not apply to the project.
Such a permissive vesting rule creates a danger of devel-
oper speculation in building permits.57 However, Washington
courts have considered the costs of submitting applications and
the time limitations on commencing construction to be suffi-
cient to eliminate any need for courts to inquire into the good
faith of applicants.' Additionally, local governments can pro-
tect themselves by adopting interim zoning measures in order
50. See West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 50-51, 720 P.2d 782,
785 (1986) ("West Main I"); Allenbach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 676 P.2d
473 (1984); State ex rel Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
51. West Main I, 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785.
52. See R. SETLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENViRONMENTAL LAW 42.
53. E.g., Allenbach, 101 Wash. 2d at 198, 676 P.2d at 475; Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d
125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958). In Hull, the Washington Supreme Court expressed
its preference for a rule that avoids searching through the moves and countermoves of
the parties to find the date of substantial change of position that finally vests the right
to develop. Vesting of development rights upon building permit application was
adjudged the more practical rule to administer.
54. See West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785; see generally Hill, Vested
Rights in the Post-Modern World, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW SEcTION OF
THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N 7-B3 (1986).
55. The court "recognized that '[a]lthough less than a fee interest, development
rights are beyond question a valuable right in property."' West Main I, 106 Wash. 2d
at 50, 720 P.2d at 785 (quoting Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422, 428, 617 P.2d
977, 981 (1980)).
56. Id.
57. Eg., Allenbach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 199, 676 P.2d 473, 476
(1984).
58. Id.
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to safeguard the public welfare pending completion of a new
zoning scheme.59
Another danger of such permissive vesting, not specifically
addressed by the Washington courts, is that local governments
will be unable to protect the public interest from development
that is permitted under current zoning but does not respond to
changed conditions and unforeseen circumstances. In the vast
majority of states, local governments may protect this public
interest by simply changing their zoning regulations prior to
permit issuance and substantial reliance upon that permit by
the developer.' Insofar as these changed or unforeseen condi-
tions fall within SEPA's broad definition of "elements of the
environment,"' this public interest is protected in Washington
by substantive SEPA authority. An otherwise acceptable pro-
ject may be denied on the basis of the environmental impacts
of the particular plan submitted.6' In this way, substantive
SEPA acts as a kind of safety valve for the Washington vested
rights doctrine. In fact, the central tension in the substantive
SEPA cases has been between the need for local governments
to retain flexibility in their decision-making by using substan-
tive SEPA and the policies of the vested rights doctrine to pro-
tect the development rights of landowners and developers.
The vested rights doctrine, which developed as a common
law rule of the Washington courts, was codified in 1987.1 The
new statutes specifically exempt conditions and denials
imposed under SEPA authority from the operation of the
vested rights doctrine.64 Even in West Main I, which contains
59. Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969); see
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.790.
60. See R. SETtLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENViRONMENTAL LAw 40 (1984).
61. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-440.
62. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 52, 65-66, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312-13.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.095 (as applicable to building permits); WASH. REV.
CODE § 58.17.033 (as applicable to subdivision plats).
Before the passage of § 58.17.033, the common law rule for subdivision plats was
that the right to develop did not vest until ninety days after the plat permit
application. Ninety days is the statutory limit for agency action under WASH. REV.
CODE § 58.17.140. Seemingly, the new statute changes this common law rule and fixes
the regulatory ordinances under which the plat will be considered at the time of plat
application. Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 58.17.033 with Norco Construction v. King
County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982); Carlson v. Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash.
App. 402, 704 P.2d 663 (1985); Wildner v. Winslow, 35 Wash. App 77, 664 P.2d 1316
(1983).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.095(3) and WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(3) ("The
limitations imposed by this section shall not restrict conditions imposed under chapter
43.21C RCW.")
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the Washington Supreme Court's strongest statement of the
vested rights doctrine to date, the court explicitly recognized
that "under the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 a
municipality has the discretion to deny an application for a
building permit because of adverse environmental impacts
even if the application meets all other requirements and condi-
tions for issuance. '
Although substantive SEPA denials are statutorily exempt
from the vested rights doctrine, such denials are subject to and
conditioned by the vested rights doctrine in one respect.
Under the vested rights doctrine, developers who file valid per-
mit or plat applications have a vested right to have their appli-
cation processed according to the zoning and land use
ordinances in effect at the time of application." Recent court
decisions have held, and common sense dictates, that SEPA
statutes (including local agency SEPA policies) qualify as such
zoning and land use ordinances.67 This would seem to imply
that all SEPA statutes and local SEPA policies must be in
effect at the time of permit or plat application-the rule appli-
cable to all other zoning and land use regulations. However,
the SEPA Rules specify that SEPA denials may be based only
on SEPA policies that are formally adopted and in effect at the
time of the issuance of a DEIS or the DNS." This provision of
the SEPA Rules has never been squarely before the courts.69
As a result, it is presently unclear exactly when SEPA policies
65. West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d at 53, 720 P.2d at 786 (citing Polygon Corp. v. City
of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) and Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash.
App. 410, 618 P.2d 1030 (1980)).
66. E.g., id. at 50-51, 720 P.2d at 785.
67. Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. App. 755, 761, 745 P.2d
1328, 1331 (1987).
68. WASH. ADmiN. CODE § 197-11-60.
69. See Victoria Tower, 49 Wash. App. at 760-61, 745 P.2d at 1331. In Victoria
Tower, Seattle used its substantive SEPA authority to deny a building permit
application for an apartment building. One of the local agency SEPA policies relied on
by the city was the Multi-Family Land Use Policies of Seattle. Victoria Tower
Partnership had applied for its building permit in August 1980; the DEIS was issued in
January 1981; and the Multi-Family Land Use Policies were not adopted until July
1981. The court held that Seattle's reliance on these policies violated the vested rights
doctrine and remanded the case to the Seattle City Council.
The offending local agency SEPA policies in this case were adopted after DEIS
issuance, and the court expressed no opinion as to whether policies adopted after
permit application but before DEIS issuance would likewise violate the vested rights
doctrine. The provision in the SEPA Rules that specifies when local agency policies
must be in effect did not apply because the proposal was initiated before the
regulation's October 1, 1984, effective date.
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must be in place to provide a basis for an exercise of substan-
tive SEPA authority. It is clear, however, that SEPA author-
ity, properly exercised, overlays the vested rights doctrine of
Washington.
Without the vested rights doctrine, it is unlikely that cases
like Cougar Mountain or West Main II would come before the
courts, at least not as "environmental law" cases. Local gov-
ernments would have had other "safety valves" to condition or
deny problematic or unpopular building permits or subdivision
plats, such as changing their substantive zoning and platting
regulations.
Washington's combination of a very permissive vested
rights doctrine" and a very strong SEPA statute, which makes
even ministerial agency actions environmentally discretion-
ary,71 is unique in the nation. The fact that Washington's sys-
tem is unique does not necessarily mean that it needs change,
however.72 Because the current system is symbiotic, a strong
argument exists that using SEPA as a safety valve for the
70. Only two other states have a vested rights doctrine similar to Washington's
which vest development rights upon the mere filing of a building permit application
(Utah, Vermont); nine states require filing of the permit application and placement of
substantial reliance upon the existing zoning laws (Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin); one state vests rights
upon building permit issuance (Georgia); thirty-five states follow the majority rule
that rights vest only after permit issuance and substantial reliance (Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming), although in some of these states issuance alone or
filing plus substantial reliance may be enough to vest rights under limited
circumstances; finally, the author is unable to determine the vesting rules in two states
(Alabama, South Dakota).
71. See Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
Washington's SEPA law, as developed in case law by the Washington courts, makes
formerly non-discretionary agency actions (e.g., the issuance of building permits to
applications that conform to applicable zoning regulations) now discretionary if the
agency decision would significantly affect the environment as broadly defined in
SEPA. Of the fourteen states that have passed state environmental policy acts, only
one other state takes the same position (Minnesota). The other twelve states follow
the lead of the federal courts, interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act, and
do not make ministerial agency actions environmentally discretionary under their
SEPA statutes. (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin).
72. The new Washington Growth Management Act did nothing to change the
vested rights doctrine. See 1990 WASH. LAws. ch. 17. However, a recently rejected
initiative launched in response to the Growth Management Act proposed to abolish the
vested rights doctrine and replace it with a rule in which development rights would
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problems posed by particular development and growth propos-
als is better than changing local land use regulations in
response to individual projects. Use of the local political pro-
cess to change zoning in response to particular projects encour-
ages the sort of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) pressure
groups to which local city and county officials are most suscep-
tible and offers little protection to the rights of landowners
planning to develop their property in reliance upon present
law. On the other hand, allowing local government officials to
make these same regulatory decisions by using SEPA provides
the benefit of SEPA's procedural protections to the applicant.
Furthermore, the SEPA decision-making process focuses the
debate on SEPA's broad list of elements of the environment,
which, significantly, does not include the narrow economic
interests of project opponents. The limits imposed upon local
governments seeking to deny projects under SEPA appear in
the West Main 11 and Cougar Mountain decisions.
IV. WEST MAIN II
In West Main II,73 a developer had applied for a permit to
construct a 22-story mixed use building in that part of down-
town Bellevue known as "Old Bellevue."74 The Bellevue City
vest only upon issuance of a valid permit or preliminary plat approval. See 1990
Initiative Measure No. 547, lines 1321-25 (The Balanced Growth Enabling Act).
The Governor's Growth Strategies Commission has submitted a compromise
proposal for legislation to change the vested rights doctrine. One likely compromise
would leave the doctrine intact except in the limited case where an applicant has
official notice of a pending change in zoning or other land use regulation. This would
eliminate the greatest perceived unfairness of the current rule-the rush to file permit
applications shortly before a new zoning or land use regulation goes into effect. See
Final Report of the Wash. Growth Strategies Comm'n.
73. West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987),
review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1988) (West Main II) (West Main II involved the
same principal parties as the 1986 Washington Supreme Court case of West Main
Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (West Main I). In West
Main I the Washington Supreme Court held that Bellevue Ordinance 3359
unconstitutionally interfered with development rights guaranteed by the vested rights
doctrine. Ordinance 3359 provided that a developer could not apply for a building
permit until the developer had obtained eight preliminary permits. It further provided
that no development right vested until the actual building permit application was filed.
The court held that this vesting scheme was a violation of due process because these
vague and discretionary pre-application procedures were unduly oppressive to
individual property owners).
74. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 515, 742 P.2d at 1268 (The "Old Bellevue"
Land Use District is the oldest and most historically significant part of the City of
Bellevue. At the time of the City Council's decision in this case, the Old Bellevue
Land Use District contained sixty existing buildings, fifty were one-story, eight were
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Council disapproved the project on two separate grounds.m
First, the council denied the application because it failed to
meet certain review criteria in the Bellevue Land Use Code.7 6
Second, the council denied the application under its substan-
tive SEPA authority as inconsistent with local SEPA policies.7
The council's objections to the proposal were similar under
both grounds for denial: excessive bulk and scale as compared
to the surrounding land uses in the area, adverse impacts on an
important historical and cultural area, obstruction of public
and private views, shadow effects, and increased traffic and its
attendant pollution.7" Upon West Main's writ of review, the
Superior Court for King County declared the council's action
void insofar as it was based on the Bellevue Land Use Code
review criteria,79 but the court upheld the council's exercise of
substantive SEPA authority.' However, the superior court
also found a violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine
and remanded the case to the city council.8 ' Both parties
appealed.
The court of appeals upheld the council's exercise of its
substantive SEPA authority in a well-organized opinion that
two-story, one was three-story, and one was four-story. Bellevue Wash., Resolution
4619 at 7 (Sept. 11, 1985) (hereinafter resolution 4619). West Main Associates' proposed
building was sited in the "Old Main" section of "Old Bellevue" - the oldest and most
historic section. "While Bellevue's history is relatively short, Old Main is the only
historical area Bellevue has .. " Id. at 17.)
75. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 515-16, 742 P.2d at 1268 (The council heard the
case on appeal from the city planning director's decision to approve the project permit.
The project had been approved by the planning director under numerous conditions.
Appeal was taken to the city council by the Three Tower Legal Fund, an association of
persons and community organizations opposed to the project.)
76. Id, at 516, 742 P.2d 1269, see Resolution 4619 at 7-17. (The council found that
the project was not in accord with the goals and policies of the comprehensive plan,
that the effect of the project on the immediate area was materially detrimental and
lacked merit, and that no reasonable mitigation measures existed. The council
acknowledged that a comprehensive plan by itself is not regulatory under Washington
law. However, Bellevue had incorporated the goals and policies of its comprehensive
plan into its land use regulatory system as ultimate standards. Resolution 4619 at 12).
77. BELLEVUE, WASH. CITY CODE § 22.02.140; see Resolution 4619 at 17-27. (BCC
§ 22.02.140 adopts as local SEPA policies the statutory SEPA policies of WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.21C.020, the policies of the Bellevue Comprehensive Plan, and the Bellevue
Land Use Code, among others.)
78. West Main I, 49 Wash. App. at 516-17, 742 P.2d at 1268-69; see Resolution 4619.
79. This issue was raised by the parties on appeal but not addressed by the court.
See Briefs of the Parties, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266.
80. West Main I1, 49 Wash. App. at 517, 742 P.2d at 1269.
81. On appeal, however, the Washington Court of Appeals found no violation of
the appearance of fairness doctrine. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 527-29, 742 P.2d at
1274-75.
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proceeded methodically through SEPA's statutory require-
ments for project denial and through the adverse impacts iden-
tified by the city in Resolution 4619.82 The court found that
the city adequately followed the procedural requirements for a
substantive SEPA denial: the city cited specific adverse
impacts that were identified in the final EIS; the council cited
specific local agency SEPA policies which were inconsistent
with West Main Associates' proposed project; and the council
adequately considered reasonable mitigation measures and
found them insufficient.' The court then proceeded to West
Main's arguments that the city's SEPA-based denial was never-
theless improper.
First, West Main contended that the adverse impacts had
not been labelled "significant" in the EIS." The court held
that the SEPA statutes and Rules, fairly read, do not require
an impact to be labelled "significant" in the EIS.s The impacts
need only be identified in the EIS. Then, in order to deny the
proposal, the agency must find on the basis of agency SEPA
policies that the impacts identified in the EIS are significantly
adverse, unmitigatable, and therefore, unacceptable. 8
Second, West Main contended that the local SEPA policies
relied on by the council were not legally valid bases for the
exercise of SEPA authority. Specifically, West Main objected
to the use of Comprehensive Plan policies, provisions of the
Land Use Code, and the general policies of SEPA."7
In its objection to the use of Comprehensive Plan policies
82. The opinion was authored by retired supreme court Justice Williams for a
three judge panel sitting as court of appeals judges pro tempore in Division One. The
other judges were sitting supreme court Justice Callow and superior court Judge
Thibodeau.
83. West Main II, 49 Wash. at 520-23, 742 P.2d at 1270-72; see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660.
84. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 523, 742 P.2d at 1272; see Opening Brief of
Appellant, 42-45, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266.
85. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 523, 742 P.2d at 1272; see WASH. REv. CODE
§ 43.21C.030(2)(c) (requiring an EIS for actions "significantly affecting the quality of
the environment."); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.031 (requiring an EIS for "only those
probable adverse environmental impacts which are significant."); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-11-400(2) ("An EIS shall provide impartial discussion of significant
environmental impacts .. "); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-402(3) ("Discussion of
insignificant impacts is not required; if included, such discussion shall be brief and
limited to summarizing impacts or noting why more study is not warranted.")
86. See West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 523, 742 P.2d at 1272; WASH. REv. CODE
§ 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660.
87. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 523-24, 742 P.2d at 1272; See Opening Brief of
Appellant at 46-49, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266.
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as SEPA policies, West Main relied primarily on language in
the Washington Optional Municipal Code," as well as a string
of non-SEPA zoning cases.89 These cases hold that specific
zoning provisions cannot be overridden by conflicting provi-
sions of a comprehensive plan because a comprehensive plan
has no regulatory effect.' West Main argued that the Bellevue
City Council violated this statute and case law when it used
the policies of the comprehensive plan "under the guise of
SEPA" in order to regulate specific zoning. The court held
that this was not a case where a comprehensive plan was being
given regulatory effect. Rather, Bellevue had expressly
adopted the comprehensive plan as a local SEPA policy and
was entitled to rely on those SEPA policies to inform its action
on West Main's proposal.92 Thus, the comprehensive plan was
not given independent regulatory effect; rather, Bellevue used
its authority to deny under SEPA. The comprehensive plan
policies were only used as validly adopted SEPA policies to
provide guidance to the city in the exercise of its substantive
SEPA authority. 3
West Main also objected to the council's use of general
provisions of its Land Use Code as local SEPA policies in deny-
ing the proposal. 4 West Main argued that it was unfair to give
88. See WASH. REv. CODE § 35A.63.080 (1989), the Optional Municipal Code under
which Bellevue derived its authority to regulate land use. The statute provides that a
comprehensive plan serves as a basic source of reference for future legislative and
administrative actions, but "the comprehensive plan shall not be construed as a
regulation of property rights or land uses."
89. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 47, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742
P.2d 1266.
90. E.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980) (Kitsap
County zoned pursuant to the Planning Enabling Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70 (1989).
Under the Act, the comprehensive plan is only a guide to development and adoption of
specific controls and has no regulatory effect. Zoning ordinances need not strictly
adhere to the comprehensive plan.); Carlson v. Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App. 402,
704 P.2d 663 (1985) (A comprehensive plan is "no more than a general guide to the
later adoption of official controls which is subordinate to specific zoning regulations."
Id. at 408, 704 P.2d at 666); Wildner v. Winslow, 35 Wash. App. 77, 664 P.2d 1316 (1983)
(Winslow zoned pursuant to the Optional Municipal Code, like Bellevue. "A
comprehensive plan is no more than a general policy guide to the later adoption of
official controls; it is not given preference over specific zoning regulations." Id. at 79,
664 P.2d at 1317.)
91. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 526, 742 P.2d at 1274; Opening Brief of
Appellant at 45-47, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266.
92. West Main 11, 49 Wash. App. at 524-25, 742 P.2d at 1273.
93. Id.
94. The City Council cited § 20.10.370A.5 of the Bellevue Land Use Code, which
sets forth the purpose of the "Old Bellevue" Land Use District. Resolution 4619 at 23.
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these general policy statements of the Land Use Code regula-
tory effect when West Main's proposed project was permissible
under the more specific zoning regulations that adopted pursu-
ant to those same general policy statements. 5 Again, the court
ruled against West Main, holding that the Land Use Code poli-
cies were not being used to regulate. Rather, they were validly
adopted SEPA policies which could be used by the Council to
provide guidance in the exercise of its SEPA authority.'
Finally, West Main objected to Bellevue's adoption and use
of the general and broad language of SEPA's general policy
statement.9' West Main argued that this exceedingly general
language was not a proper basis for denial of a project because
it provided no guidance.9" Ruling once more against West
Main, the court noted that SEPA expressly directs that "[t]he
policies, regulations, and laws of the state of Washington shall
be administered in accordance with the policies set forth in
this chapter.... ."I' The court cited Polygon, the leading sub-
stantive SEPA case, in which the Washington Supreme Court
specifically approved the use of the general policy provisions of
SEPA to deny a project proposal." In Polygon, the court held
that the general policies of SEPA may be used as local SEPA
policies and that they "provide a valid basis for declaring envi-
ronmental impacts unacceptable in a particular case."''
In sum, the West Main II court held that the procedure
used by the Bellevue City Council in its SEPA-based denial of
West Main's proposal was proper. The written findings of the
city are, in fact, an excellent example of findings that ade-
quately discuss and reference the significant adverse impacts
disclosed by the EIS, which local agency SEPA policies were
offended by the impacts, and why reasonable mitigation meas-
ures would be insufficient to adequately mitigate those
impacts.0 2 The opinion declined to place any restrictions
whatsoever upon the substance of the local agency's SEPA pol-
icies, allowing local governments to adopt and use language
95. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 51, West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742
P.2d 1266.
96. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 526, 742 P.2d at 1274.
97. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2)(b) and (d). See supra note 4 for the full
text of 43.21C.020(2).
98. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 526-27, 742 P.2d at 1274.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(1).
100. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
101. West Main II, 49 Wash. App. at 527, 742 P.2d at 1274.
102. See Resolution 4619.
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from comprehensive plans, land use codes, and the broad lan-
guage of the SEPA statute to deny proposals.
Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals decided
West Main II on September 28, 1987. West Main Associates
subsequently petitioned for review by the Washington
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King
County,"0 3 another substantive SEPA case with remarkably
similar issues, had been slowly proceeding through the land
use system's maze of administrative and judicial appeals. The
supreme court considered West Main's petition for review on
January 5, 1988, and deferred the petition pending final deter-
mination of Cougar Mountain.'"
V. COUGAR MOUNTAIN
In Cougar Mountain Associates v. King County, °" the
Washington Supreme Court reviewed a SEPA-based denial of
a developer's subdivision plat application that otherwise con-
formed to all land use regulations.1°e Finding that the King
County Council had exercised its substantive SEPA authority
improperly, the court remanded the case for further considera-
tion by the council."°
103. 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264 (1988).
104. Letter from Reginald D. Shriver, Supreme Court Clerk, to the parties of
West Main II (January 5, 1988) (Reference to Supreme Court No. 54520-1). After the
Cougar Mountain decision on December 15, 1988, the Washington Supreme Court
returned to West Main's petition, which had been awaiting the decision of the Cougar
Mountain case for a year, and denied the petition. 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (March 10, 1989).
105. 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264 (1988).
106. Agency approvals of subdivision plat applications have always been more
discretionary than building permit applications. See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.110
(1989). An agency may always disapprove a plat that fails to involve sufficient
provisions for public use and interest. Id. This was not an issue in Cougar Mountain.
107. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 743, 765 P.2d at 265 (Note that Cougar
Mountain's legal victory was largely Pyrrhic. The disposition of the case was simply
reversal of the superior court decision with instructions to remand to the King County
Council for reconsideration. The court did not grant the relief requested by appellant
Cougar Mountain Associates-a court order for King County either to grant the plat
application or to notify Cougar Mountain of the changes necessary to obtain plat
approval under the zoning at the time of permit application. See Opening Brief of
Appellant at 51, Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264 (1988)).
The Cougar Mountain case provides an excellent example of how appellants from
an administrative agency action, who win their legal battle, still face a long, slow war
of attrition because their remedy is almost always remand from whence they came.
Upon remand in Cougar Mountain, the superior court referred the issue back to the
King County Council for reconsideration. The council in turn remanded to the
Hearing Examiner for preparation of an addendum to the EIS to develop further
information concerning the environmental impacts on Ames Creek, salmon, wetlands,
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In July of 1982, Cougar Mountain Associates sought pre-
liminary plat approval to develop 101 single family residential
lots on a 135-acre parcel of land.'08 The property was zoned
"G" with a maximum density of one dwelling unit per acre. In
contrast, the King County Comprehensive Plan (both the 1964
and 1985 versions) recommended a maximum density of only
one dwelling unit per 5 acres.' A DEIS was issued in Sep-
tember of 1985 that discussed the significant impacts of erosion
and surface water runoff into a neighboring wetland, impacts
on fish and wildlife, impacts on land use, and impacts on public
services and utilities.110 The King County Building and Land
Development Division originally recommended approval of the
project as conditioned (90 lots on 128 acres), but the King
County Zoning and Subdivision Examiner recommended
denial because the proposal conflicted with the King County
Comprehensive Plan, the Agricultural Preservation Program,
provisions of the King County Zoning Code, and the policies of
SEPA. i i i Cougar Mountain appealed to the King County
Council, and the council upheld the Examiner's decision. In
denying the appeal, the council passed Ordinance 7811 in Octo-
ber of 1986, a document of less than one page which adopted
erosion, water runoff, and public facilities. (N.B. Applicants routinely bear the cost of
EIS preparation). The Examiner then remanded to the Bureau of Land Use and
Development (BALD) for preparation of the EIS addendum. Cougar Mountain
Associates filed a writ of review challenging the required EIS addendum, and the
superior court ruled in early 1989 that the addendum could be required but that the
county had to produce the addendum by September 1989. The addendum was finally
issued in December 1989; the Subdivision Technical Committee of BALD issued its
report in February 1990; and public hearings were commenced on February 22, 1990.
Eight additional hearings, were held through March, April, and May. The Hearing
Examiner finally recommended approval of the plat on June 29, 1990. By this time
Cougar Mountain had again downsized their proposal to 63 lots on 128 acres with
significantly greater setbacks from the most environmentally sensitive areas. See
OFFICE OF THE ZONING AND SUBDIVISION EXAMINER, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE KING COUNTY, WASH., COUNCIL (June 29, 1990) (BALD no. 1082-83, Proposed
Plat of Ames Lake Hills). At least six separate appeals of the decision of the Hearing
Examiner have been filed to the King County Council, and it is anticipated that the
council will hear this new appeal of Cougar Mountain's 1982 plat application by late
fall of 1990.
108. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 743-44, 765 P.2d at 265.
109. Id. at 745, 765 P.2d at 266.
110. Id. at 745, 765 P.2d at 266; see King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 (February
2, 1987). The proposed site bordered on and drained into Ames Lake Wetland No. 57, a
breeding ground for migratory fowl and resident wildlife. Ames Creek, a significant
salmon spawning stream, flows through the wetland.
111. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 745-46, 765 P.2d at 266-267.
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and incorporated the Examiner's findings and conclusions."'l
In November of 1986, Cougar Mountain Associates sought
review in King County Superior Court." 3
In February of 1987, less than four weeks before trial, the
council decided that Ordinance 7811 did not accurately reflect
the reasons for the council's denial. As a result, the council
amended Ordinance 7811 and entered new findings and conclu-
sions in Ordinance 7945.114 Ordinance 7945 denied Cougar
Mountain's project "[b]ased upon the environmental impacts of
the proposed development .. ."I" After the superior court
found for King County, Cougar Mountain's direct appeal to the
Washington Supreme Court was accepted.
Cougar Mountain argued strongly on appeal that the man-
ner of this "post hoc justification," taken months after the
council's original decision, was irregular and should be
declared unlawful." 6  However, an agency is generally not
required to enter findings contemporaneously with its decision
and such late adoptions are not per se error absent a showing
of prejudice by plaintiff." 7 The supreme court's opinion failed
to mention the issue and did not suggest any prejudice on the
part of the council.118 Thus, it would be purely speculative to
suggest that the late adoption of findings entered into the
court's decision.
The first issue that the Cougar Mountain court discussed
was the appropriate standard of judicial review." 9 Ordinarily,
agency action is reviewed under the deferential "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.'2° However, earlier SEPA cases reasoned
that the policies of SEPA were of particular importance to the
112. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 746, 765 P.2d at 266; King County, Wash.,
Ordinance 7811 (October 6, 1986).
113. Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, No. 86-2-23945-6 (King County
Super. Ct. April 14, 1987).
114. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 (February 2, 1987); see Cougar Mountain
111 Wash. 2d at 746, 765 P.2d at 266; Opening Brief of Appellant at 19-20, Cougar
Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264.
115. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 1 (January 26, 1987).
116. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 27-33, Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d 742,
765 P.2d 264 (arguing that the council's actions offended due process and urging the
court to adopt a rule making findings of fact in land use adjudications non-revisable
except for minor errors).
117. See West Hill Citizens v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 168, 627 P.2d 1002
(1981).
118. See Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 746, 765 P.2d at 266.
119. Id. at 747-50, 765 P.2d at 267-69.
120. See infr note 170 for a discussion of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review.
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legislature and that the broader scrutiny of the "clearly erro-
neous" standard was appropriate when reviewing the issuance
of a DNS. 2' Likewise, the court in Polygon held that the
clearly erroneous standard was appropriate for review of a sub-
stantive SEPA denial of a building permit. 2 2 However, the
standard of review for the denial of a subdivision plat was a
matter of first impression. 2 3 In part I, the Cougar Mountain
opinion, the court decided that application of the clearly erro-
neous standard was appropriate for plat denials as well.12 1
In part II of the opinion, the court evaluated the council's
action under the procedural requirements governing SEPA
denials and found it to be inadequate.'25 Finally, in part III of
the opinion, the court addressed the council's use of the King
County Comprehensive Plan to deny Cougar Mountain's pro-
posal. In this last section of the opinion, the court held that
the council could not use the comprehensive plan in this fash-
ion because a comprehensive plan is only a general policy
guide, which is subordinate to specific zoning regulations. 12
The problem the court faced in these final two sections of the
opinion was the question of what authority the council had
relied on in Ordinance 7945 when it denied Cougar Mountain's
proposal. Some confusion is understandable because Ordi-
nance 7945 is not a model of clarity.
One plausible reading of Ordinance 7945 is that the council
relied purely on its SEPA authority. The decision section of
Ordinance 7945 reads in part: "Therefore, pursuant to the
authority provided by Chapter 43.21C RCW and King County
Code Chapter 20.44 [the statute that identifies King County
SEPA policies, including the policies of the comprehensive
plan], the proposal is denied with leave to submit a revised
application.' 12 7 Both parties seemed to understand the case in
121. E.g., Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County, 87 Wash.
2d 267, 274-75, 552 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1976).
122. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 68-69, 578 P.2d 1309, 1314-15
(1978).
123. See Cougar Mountain at 747-750, 765 P.2d at 267-69.
124. Cougar Mountain at 750, 765 P.2d at 269; see infra notes 165-178 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the standards of judicial review for substantive
SEPA denial in general and a discussion of the clearly erroneous standard in
particular.
125. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 750-55, 765 P.2d at 269-71; see WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660.
126. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755-57, 765 P.2d at 271-72.
127. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 9.
1990] 163
164 University of Puget Sound Law Review
this way because they briefed the case purely as a SEPA denial
case. 12 8
It is also plausible, however, to interpret Ordinance 7945 as
denying Cougar Mountain's application on the basis of both
SEPA authority and conflict with the King County Compre-
hensive Plan. The decision section of Ordinance 7945 states
that "[t]he proposal also conflicts with numerous policies of the
King County Comprehensive Plan-1985."'' 9 Further, at conclu-
sion 3, the county stated that "[t]he proposal as presently envi-
sioned also conflicts with numerous policies of the King
County Comprehensive Plan-1985."'1
The organization of Ordinance 7945 only adds to the ambi-
guity. Findings 1 through 9 of the ordinance discuss the
adverse impacts of the Cougar Mountain proposal, but the spe-
cific policies or statutes offended by each impact are not
included point by point.131 Thus, the Cougar Mountain court
could have interpreted Ordinance 7945 in either way.
The court majority seems to have adopted the second view.
The court appears to have interpreted the King County Coun-
cil's Ordinance 7945 as denying Cougar Mountain's plat appli-
cation upon both the council's substantive SEPA authority and
the application's inconsistency with the King County Compre-
hensive Plan. In its opening discussion of the case, the court
stated that "[t]he new ordinance reflected the council's deter-
rmination that Cougar Mountain's proposal should be denied
because the subdivision would result in significant adverse
environmental impacts that could not reasonably be mitigated.
The council also concluded that the proposal conflicted with
several policies of the 1985 King County Comprehensive
Plan."'32 Later in its opinion, the court reiterated that "[i]n
this case, the King County Council apparently based its denial
of Cougar Mountain's application on conflicts with SEPA and
the 1985 King County Comprehensive Plan."'" When the
128. See Briefs of the Parties, Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 264
(1988).
129. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 9.
130. IdA; No mention is made in Ordinance 7945 of the Agricultural Preservation
Program or the King County Zoning Code provisions upon which the subdivision
examiner relied in addition to the King County Comprehensive Plan and the policies
of SEPA.
131. See King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 2-8; cf. Bellevue Resolution 4619
(the findings and conclusions of the Bellevue City Council in West Main H1).
132. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 746, 765 P.2d at 266 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 752, 765 P.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
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majority opinion is viewed in this light, the organization of the
opinion makes sense. Part II of the opinion discusses the coun-
cil's denial of the proposal under its substantive SEPA author-
ity and finds the denial inadequate because of procedural
shortcomings. Part III of the opinion discusses the council's
separate denial of the proposal as conflicting with the compre-
hensive plan.
The thrust of part II of the opinion is that Ordinance 7945
did not fulfill the procedural protections guaranteed by
SEPA.13 First, SEPA requires the council to find that the plat
would result in significant adverse environmental impacts as
disclosed by the EIS.13 The council discussed the adverse
environmental impacts of the proposal in findings 1 through 9
of Ordinance 7945. Although the council's discussion was
rather general and never cited to the specific portions of the
EIS, the court seemed to indicate that the significant adverse
impacts of the proposal were set forth in sufficient detail."3
However, SEPA also requires that a denial be based on for-
mally adopted policies designated as possible bases for the
exercise of SEPA authority and that the agency cite the SEPA
policy that is the basis for any denial.' 37 Here the court found
that the council had "failed to describe the specific SEPA poli-
cies with which Cougar Mountain's application conflicted.' 'las
After detailing the significant adverse impacts, Ordinance 7945
makes only a blanket reference to the statute containing the
King County SEPA policies"3 and then concludes in summary
fashion.'' The Cougar Mountain court found that these con-
clusions failed to satisfy SEPA: "The Council merely stated in
a conclusory fashion that the proposal would result in signifi-
cant environmental impacts and that these impacts could not
134. Id. at 750-55, 765 P.2d at 269-71.
135. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660.
136. See Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 753-755, 765 P.2d at 270-271; King
County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 2-8; Compare Nagatani Brothers, Inc. v. Skagit
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 108 Wash. 2d 477, 739 P.2d 696 (1987) (where the record was
clearly inadequate because the findings of significant adverse impacts were practically
non-existent and the final EIS was little more than a list of agencies to whom the draft
EIS had been sent) with West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (in Bellevue
Resolution 4619 every finding of adverse impact is detailed and cited to specific pages
of the EIS).
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(1).
138. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 753, 765 P.2d at 270.
139. KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 20.44.080 (1989).
140. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 8-9.
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reasonably be mitigated.' 1 4 1
The court placed special stress on the third requirement
for SEPA denials, which provides that the agency must find
that reasonable mitigation measures are insufficient to miti-
gate the identified impacts.' 42 The council failed to specifically
discuss reasonable mitigation measures to counteract the
impacts and failed to state specifically why such measures
would be inadequate. 143 Ordinance 7945 briefly mentions some
of the proposed mitigations from the EIS, such as a native
growth protection easement along the wetlands and creek;'"
however, the court felt strongly that this was not enough for a
SEPA denial:
If proposals are rejected on the basis of SEPA concerns,
the agency must spell out its objections and how they can be
satisfied or, if not, why not. Thus, before denying a proposal
on SEPA grounds, we hold that an agency must (1) specifi-
cally set forth potential adverse environmental impacts that
would result from implementation of the proposal, and (2)
specifically set forth reasonable mitigation measures to
counteract these impacts, or, if such measures do not exist,
(3) specifically state why the impacts are unavoidable and
development should not be allowed. The King County
Council did not follow this procedure. 145
The court based its holding in part II squarely on King
County's non-compliance with the procedural protections of
SEPA listed above. The court did not invalidate any of King
County's local SEPA policies, which included the King County
Comprehensive Plan. The findings and conclusions of King
County in Ordinance 7945 simply did not meet SEPA's strict
requirements of specificity."4 In part III of the opinion, the
court proceeds to discuss the council's error in relying on its
141. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 753, 765 P.2d at 270.
142. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.060; WAsH. ADlMN. CODE § 197-11-660(1)(f).
143. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755, 765 P.2d at 271.
144. King County, Wash., Ordinance 7945 at 8 (in conclusion 2).
145. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755, 765 P.2d at 271.
146. See Resolution 4619 (the findings and conclusions from West Main I). This
resolution is a good example of findings that probably would meet this test. Resolution
4619 proceeds methodically through the significant adverse impacts identified in the
EIS, citing to specific page numbers of the EIS, and citing and quoting the specific local
agency SEPA policies offended by each adverse impact. Possible mitigation measures
are set out in more detailed discussions with references to the EIS; see also Bellevue,
Wash., Resolution 5115 (March 20, 1989) (the findings in the substantive SEPA denial
case of Safeway Stores v. Bellevue, No. 89-2 05765-4 (August 8, 1989).
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comprehensive plan to deny Cougar Mountain's application.'4 7
In part III of its opinion, the court followed a long line of
non-SEPA zoning cases by holding that a comprehensive plan
is only a general policy guide and may not be used to override
a valid zoning regulation.'" The council thus "erred in relying
on the provisions of the King County Comprehensive Plan to
deny Cougar Mountain's application."' 49 This section of the
opinion should be understood to stand for the sole proposition
that a comprehensive plan may not be used on its own to over-
ride zoning. From the opening sentence, the language of this
part of the opinion strongly suggests that the court considered
the comprehensive plan an issue separate from substantive
SEPA authority.1 "o Significantly, part III of the Cougar Moun-
tain opinion contains no reference to SEPA or to the use of a
comprehensive plan as a SEPA policy.15 1
147. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755-57, 765 P.2d at 271-72.
148. See supra note 96.
149. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 757, 765 P.2d at 272.
150. See id. at 755, 765 P.2d at 270 ("Cougar Mountain also asserts that the council
erred when it used the King County, Wash., Comprehensive Plan as a means for
denying Cougar Mountain's subdivision application." (emphasis added)).
151. The Cougar Mountain court created unneeded confusion by citing to
Nagatani Bros. v. Skagit County Bd. of Comm'rs, 108 Wash. 2d 477, 739 P.2d 696 (1987),
for the proposition that a conflict between a zoning ordinance and a comprehensive
plan must be resolved by application of the zoning ordinance, because Nagatani was
also a substantive SEPA case, among other things. (The court also cited two non-
SEPA zoning decisions for the proposition; Norco Construction v. King County, 97
Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982), and Carlson v. Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App.
402, 704 P.2d 663 (1985)).
In Nagatani, Skagit County denied a preliminary plat application because of
adverse traffic impacts, loss of agricultural land, conflicts between residential and
agricultural uses, and non-compliance with the comprehensive plan. The findings and
conclusions of the County were practically nonexistent, and it was impossible for the
court to tell what authority the County had relied on to deny the application. The
County attempted to justify its denial, in part, upon SEPA. (This SEPA defense of the
County action was evidently not even raised in the court below. See Nagatani Bros. v.
Skagit County, 46 Wash. App. 106, 728 P.2d 1104 (1986)). An EIS was prepared in the
case, but the DEIS disclosed no unmitigable impacts and the final FEIS was merely a
list of the agencies to whom the DEIS had been circulated, none of whom had raised
any concerns. None of SEPA's procedural requirements for denial were complied
with.
The Nagatani court did not say that a comprehensive plan cannot be used as a
SEPA policy, and the confusing opinion, based on an insufficient and confusing
administrative record, does not stand for that proposition.
The interesting aspect of the Nagatani opinion for appellants is that the remedy
granted by the Washington Supreme Court was remanded to the county
commissioners with an order to approve the plat. This is the only published
substantive SEPA case which grants such a remedy. All other cases have either
upheld the agency action or remanded to the agency for reconsideration.
168 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The dissent in Cougar Mountain interpreted the majority
opinion differently. 5 2 The dissent took the majority to task
for holding "that the zoning code repeals and/or supersedes
SEPA if the comprehensive plan is not in accordance with the
zoning code."'" The dissent clearly felt that the majority opin-
ion incorrectly overturned the court of appeals' holding in
West Main II, which explicitly recognized an agency's right to
rely upon language from comprehensive plans when denying
proposals. The Cougar Mountain dissent stated that "[s]ince
the Council adopted the comprehensive plan as a local SEPA
policy, it was entitled to rely on the comprehensive plan in
denying the proposal under SEPA."' The better interpreta-
tion of the Cougar Mountain majority, however, is that the
opinion is consistent with West Main II.
VI. COUGAR MOUNTAIN AND WEST MAN II ARE CONSISTENT
The actual language and organizational scheme of the Cou-
gar Mountain majority opinion clearly indicate that the major-
ity thought that King County denied Cougar Mountain's
proposal on two bases: substantive SEPA and inconsistency
with the King County Comprehensive Plan. ' The ambiguity
of Ordinance 7945 lends support to this interpretation.15 The
Cougar Mountain decision makes explicit what was implicit in
West Main II. After Cougar Mountain, it is clear that agencies
must rigidly adhere to the procedural requirements of substan-
tive SEPA authority. Written findings in future substantive
SEPA denial cases will be especially important because courts
will closely examine them for this procedural compliance. The
adverse environmental impacts identified in the EIS must be
discussed with some specificity. Agencies must specify for each
impact the formal agency SEPA policy offended. Perhaps
most important, reasonable mitigation measures must be thor-
oughly considered before an agency may deny a proposal upon
concluding that the identified adverse impacts cannot be miti-
gated. This is consistent with West Main II because the writ-
152. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 758-63, 765 P.2d at 273-75 (Dore and
Pearson, JJ., dissenting) (The dissent would have upheld the council's actions as
satisfying SEPA's procedural protections).
153. Id at 761, 765 P.2d at 274 (Dore and Pearson, JJ, dissenting).
154. Id at 763, 765 P.2d at 275 (citing West Main II, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d
1266) (Dore and Pearson, JJ., dissenting).
155. See supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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ten findings involved in West Main II were a model of such
procedural compliance.
Neither decision puts any substantive restrictions on the
content of local agency SEPA policies. The Cougar Mountain
court merely held that a comprehensive plan, on its own, has
no regulatory effect. Thus, the Cougar Mountain decision does
not overturn the holding in West Main II that comprehensive
plans, land use codes, or the broad general policies of the
SEPA statute may be adopted and used by agencies to guide
their discretion in the exercise of their substantive SEPA
authority.
In addition, the peculiar procedural nexus between the
two cases indicates that the supreme court regarded West
Main II as consistent with Cougar Mountain. West Main's
petition for review to the supreme court was deferred for a
year pending the decision in Cougar Mountain, and after that
decision, the petition was denied.'57 Ordinarily, denial of a
petition for review does not imply approval, but here denial
seems to be based on the court's finding that West Main II was
consistent with Cougar Mountain. Moreover, Justice Callow,
who was on the three-judge panel that decided West Main II,
wrote the majority opinion for the supreme court in Cougar
Mountain.'" This peculiar appellate history is another indica-
tion that the cases are consistent and that they provide a good
assessment of the current limits of substantive SEPA
authority.
VII. CURRENT LIMITATIONS ON SUBSTANTivE SEPA
A. The Clearly Erroneous Standard of Judicial Review
Since 1983 SEPA has explicitly granted an aggrieved per-
son the right to judicial review of agency compliance with
SEPA's requirements. 59 Prior to 1983, the courts inferred a
right to judicial review." ° The SEPA statute and rules are
silent, however, as to the proper standard for this judicial
review.
157. See supra note 104.
158. See Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 743, 765 P.2d at 265; West Main Assocs.
v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 515 (1987) (in footnote), review denied, 112
Wash. 2d 1009 (1988).
159. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.075; WAH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-680(8).
160. See Ieschi Improvement Council v. Wash. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash.
2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974); Coughlin v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 27 Wash. App. 888,
621 P.2d 183 (1980).
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Consequently, Washington courts have settled on the mod-
erately broad scrutiny of the clearly erroneous standard of
review"8 ' for considering SEPA denials"2 rather than the more
common and more deferential arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review for administrative action.'6 The clearly errone-
ous standard requires the court to review the entire record and
examine all the evidence in light of the public policy contained
in the legislation authorizing the agency action.' 64 The court
will not overturn the agency's judgment unless it is "left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.""'5 This standard calls for "a higher degree of judicial
scrutiny than is normally appropriate for administrative
action.' 166
In Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Association v.
King County, 67 the Washington Supreme Court recognized
that this broader degree of scrutiny was appropriate when
reviewing negative threshold determinations (DNS) under
SEPA. The court reasoned that the policies of SEPA were of
particular importance to the legislature and that the broader
scrutiny of the clearly erroneous standard was an appropriate
check on possible short-cuts of the SEPA decision-making pro-
cess.'" In the later case of Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle,"9
the Washington Supreme Court held that this broader review
was equally appropriate when reviewing an agency's SEPA
denial of a building permit because environmental factors are
not readily quantifiable and because agency decisions are often
161. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(e) (1989).
162. E.g., Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 747-49, 765 P.2d at 267-68; Polygon
Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 52, 69-70, 578 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1978).
163. See WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130(e); Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843,
613 P.2d 1148 (1980). Arbitrary and capricious conduct is "willful and unreasonable
action, without consideration and [in] disregard of facts or circumstances. Where there
is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious when exercised
honestly and upon due consideration though it may be felt that a different conclusion
might have been reached." Barrie, 93 Wash. 2d at 850, 613 P.2d at 1152 (quoting Buell
v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 526, 495 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1972)).
164. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 461 P.2d 531, 534 (1969).
165. Polygon, 90 Wash. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315; Ancheta, 77 Wash. 2d at 259-60,
461 P.2d at 534.
166. Polygon, 90 Wash. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315; see State ex rel Randall v.
Snohomish County, 79 Wash. 2d 619, 625, 488 P.2d 511, 514-15 (1971).
167. 87 Wash. 2d 267, 274-75, 552 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1976).
168. Id.; see generally Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
in Washington State - Doctrine, Analysis, and Proposed Revisions, 60 WASH. L. REV.
653, 662 (1985).
169. 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
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made in an atmosphere of intense political pressure, which is
conducive to abuse of discretion.170 The court in Cougar Moun-
tain explicitly extended this reasoning to the substantive
SEPA denial of a subdivision plat. 7 '
Washington courts recognize that SEPA serves legitimate
functions, but are concerned that SEPA authority will be used
by overreaching local governments to block projects merely
because the projects are unpopular. 7 2 Use of the broader
review of the clearly erroneous standard helps courts to ensure
that SEPA denials are a responsible exercise of power and that
the agency made its decision after weighing the arguments and
alternatives evenhandedly.
B Procedural Limitations
The importance of stringent procedural limitations on the
exercise of substantive SEPA authority has been clear at least
since Polygon Corp. v. Seattle.173 The Washington Supreme
Court recognized in Polygon that procedural safeguards are
particularly important to protect property owners from arbi-
trary and abusive regulatory action.174 SEPA often has been
described as essentially a procedural statute designed to ensure
that environmental impacts and alternatives are properly and
fairly considered by the agency decision-maker, without dictat-
ing results and without usurping local decision-making. 175
The lesson of Cougar Mountain is that courts will look
very closely for procedural compliance with the substantive
SEPA provisions.' 6 Written agency findings and conclusions
are particularly important because they document agency com-
pliance with this procedural mandate. 7 7 The significant
170. Id. at 68-69, 578 P.2d at 1314-15; see generally Note, A Standard for Judicial
Review of Administrative Decisionmaking Under SEPA - Polygon Corp. v. City of
Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978), 54 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1979).
171. Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 747-50, 765 P.2d
264, 267-69 (1988).
172. See Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 466, 572 P.2d 359, 366 (1978);
Kenart & Assocs. v. Skagit County, 37 Wash. App. 295, 303, 680 P.2d 439, 444 (1984).
173. See Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 52, 66-67, 578 P.2d 1309, 1313-
14.
174. Id. at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315.
175. Eg., Save Our Rural Env't (SORE) v. Snohomish County, 99 Wash. 2d 363,
371, 662 P.2d 816, 820 (1983).
-176. See Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 765 P.2d 265
(1988); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660.
177. See Kenart & Assocs. v. Skagit County, 37 Wash. App. 295, 680 P.2d 439
(1984). Two examples of written findings which meet this procedural requirement of
1990]
172 University of Puget Sound Law Review
adverse environmental impacts as identified' 78 in the EIS must
be set out specifically. 7 9 The local agency SEPA policies that
conflict with each impact and form the basis for denial must
also be set out specifically."s Further, the written findings
must contain an explicit discussion of reasonable mitigation
measures and the reasons why they are inadequate.' 8 '
Adequate findings not only enable the developer to satisfy
the agency's objection and file another application, but they
also make appellate review possible.' 2 A similar motive
underlies the judicial requirement of adequate findings as the
judicial adoption of the clearly erroneous standard of review.
When an agency provides adequate findings and conclusions,
the court can more easily determine whether the substantive
SEPA denial was a responsible exercise of power. Local gov-
ernment may not use SEPA as a pretext to deny a politically,
or otherwise unpopular, project but must make their decisions
based on the environmental impacts and alternatives presented
in the EIS.I s This sounds like good news indeed for landown-
ers who desire to develop their property. However, this proce-
dural good news for developers must be tempered with the
lessons of Cougar Mountain and West Main II: there are only
the slimmest of substantive restraints on local agencies exercis-
ing substantive SEPA authority.
C. Substantive Limitations-Content of Local
Agency SEPA Policies
Plaintiffs in SEPA denial cases have attacked the content
specificity are the findings in West Main II, Resolution No. 4619 (September 11, 1985),
and the written findings in the recent substantive SEPA denial case of Safeway Stores
v. City of Bellevue, No. 89-2 05767-4 (King County Super. Ct. August 8, 1989), Bellevue,
Wash.,Resolution 5115 (March 20, 1989). It is useful to compare these two documents
with the written findings that the court found insufficient in Cougar Mountain, King
County, Wash., Ordinance No. 7945 (February 2, 1987).
178. The impacts need not be labelled as "significant" in the EIS. See supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text.
179. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755, 765 P.2d at 271; Levine v. Jefferson
County, 54 Wash. App. 88, 92, 772 P.2d 528, 530 (1989), opinion withdrawn (January 24,
1990), off'd, 57 Wash. App. 1002 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060(1); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(b).
180. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 753, 765 P.2d at 270; WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660(b).
181. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 755, 765 P.2d at 271; WAH. REv. CODE
§ 43.21C.060(2); WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 197-11-660(b).
182. Kenart Assocs. v. Skagit County, 37 Wash. App. 295, 680 P.2d 439 (1984).
183. Id. at 303, 680 P.2d at 444.
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of local agency SEPA policies, seeking to invalidate some types
of policies upon which the agency has relied for its decision.' 4
Landowners have challenged policies as being so vague and dis-
cretionary that they are unable to plan their conduct with rea-
sonable certainty.18 It has also been argued that many
municipalities have adopted SEPA policies that contradict each
other, and thus, landowners are unable to plan development
with reasonable certainty.'6 Thus far, Washington courts have
shown almost no inclination to limit agency discretion on the
content of adopted policies.'87
The legislature has given broad discretion to local govern-
ment in the adoption of local SEPA policies.1'T The SEPA
statute and rules do not specifically identify the types of poli-
cies that may be adopted and require only that the identified
policies be interpreted and administered in accordance with
the general policies of SEPA. 8 9 The legislature intended that
the SEPA statute and rules enable local governments to adopt
broad, flexible policies so that local governments would have
flexibility to respond to the environmental criteria disclosed by
the EIS.'" Local governments would lose all flexibility to
respond to changing environmental information if required to
establish strict, predictable policies. This is especially true in
Washington because of the liberal vesting rules of the state's
vested rights doctrine. Thus, the requirement of designated
policies appears to be a loose notice requirement rather than a
strict rule-making requirement. 191
Washington courts have been untroubled by agency reli-
ance on general policy statements.192 This is a predictable
result because Washington courts have accepted discretionary
zoning and the trend to more flexible, tailored land use regula-
184. See West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 523-24, 742 P.2d
1266, 1272 (1987), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1988).
185. Id.
186. See Hill, Vested Rights in the Post-Modern World, FouRTH ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LAND USE LAw MiD-YEAR, WASH. STATE BAR Assoc. 7B-8 (1986).
187. But see Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 46 Wash. App. 793, 732 P.2d 1013 (1987) (see
infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text).
188. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-660 and
902.
189. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.020 and .030(1).
190. TEN YEARS' ExPE CE WrrH SEPA: FINAL REPORT OF THE COInTEE ON
ENViRONMENTAL PoLicY at 39 (1983).
191. See Rodgers, The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV.
36, 61 (1984).
192. Eg., Polygon Corp. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
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tions. 93 Broad standards are deemed sufficient if procedural
safeguards are met.1 This trend continues in Cougar Moun-
tain and West Main II, and the decision in Cougar Mountain
demonstrates that Washington courts will stringently enforce
these procedural safeguards.
The issue of whether a comprehensive plan may be
adopted and used as a SEPA policy was not conclusively put to
rest by the rather ambiguous language of the court in Cougar
Mountain and will likely continue to be argued by advo-
cates. 195 The better analysis is that current law allows a com-
prehensive plan to be validly adopted and used as a SEPA
policy. The West Main II and Cougar Mountain decisions are
consistent on this point; the Cougar Mountain court merely
held that zoning may not be overridden by a comprehensive
plan on its own authority.1 6 The argument to the contrary
seems frivolous because a local government agency could easily
circumvent such a prohibition. The agency could merely write
and adopt, independently of the comprehensive plan, a SEPA
policy that is identical or virtually identical to that comprehen-
sive plan.
The only substantive SEPA case to date in which a court
may have invalidated the content of a local agency SEPA pol-
icy is Prisk v. Poulsbo.19 In Prisk, the City of Poulsbo exer-
cised its substantive SEPA authority to condition a
condominium project proposal. The City had adopted an ordi-
nance authorizing imposition of park fees on developers in lieu
of land dedication. The Washington Supreme Court had previ-
ously held that such development fee statutes were invalid
ultra vires taxation. 9 ' The City of Poulsbo argued that they
could still impose the development fees under their substan-
tive SEPA authority and pointed to the invalid ordinance "as
193. See Save Our Rural Env't (SORE) v. Snohomish County, 99 Wash. 2d 363, 369,
662 P.2d 816, 819 (1983).
194. See, e.g., Polygon, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309.
195. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 9, Safeway Stores v. Bellevue, No. 89-2
05765-4 (King County Super. Ct. August 8, 1989) Superior Court of King County,
Wash. In Sqfeway Stores, Bellevue successfully used its substantive SEPA authority to
deny a building permit for a Safeway superstore. Safeway did not appeal the superior
court judgment but the owner of the property upon which Safeway intended to build
was a party to the suit and did appeal. However, before the case came before the court
of appeals the appellant decided to pursue other development opportunities and
voluntarily dismissed the appeal.
196. See supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
197. 46 Wash. App. 793, 732 P.2d 1013 (1987).
198. HIllis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
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evidence of an existing environmental policy regarding
increased population density and the resulting need for
parks."1 99
The Prisk court assumed without deciding that a local gov-
ernment could bypass the Hillis Homes prohibition against
such fees by a valid exercise of substantive SEPA authority. 2
The opinion is opaque, however, concerning the exact SEPA or
constitutional reason for striking down the city's action. It is
possible that the City had merely failed to validly adopt a local
SEPA policy concerning the environmental need for parks. 20 1
However, the court also demanded a "reasonable relationship
between the conditions or fees imposed and the environmental
objective." 2 Thus, the opinion may stand for the proposition
that a flat fee of $200 per dwelling unit, applicable to all dwell-
ing units irregardless of the specifics of the individual proposal,
is not reasonably related to the "specific adverse environmen-
tal impacts which are identified in the environmental docu-
ments prepared. . . ."" This could be read to impose a
substantive limitation similar to the rational relation require-
ment of substantive due process on either the content of SEPA
policies or the content of mitigating measures.
D. Substantive Limitations-Substantive Due Process
The underlying basis for substantive SEPA is, of course,
the police power. Therefore, the doctrinal limits on the police
power are also limits on the exercise of substantive SEPA. In
West Main I, the Washington Supreme Court applied the sub-
stantive due process formulation to all land use ordinances. 20'
These due process limitations apply to local agency SEPA ordi-
nances, as well as to other land use ordinances."03
Washington courts have generally viewed SEPA as pri-
marily a procedural statute and have declined to decide cases
on a substantive due process basis. However, several recent
non-SEPA land use cases have applied substantive due process
199. Priak, 46 Wash. App. at 801, 732 P.2d at 1019.
200. Id. at 802, 732 P.2d at 1019.
201. "The need for parks is not an environmental concern simply because the city
engineer calls it one, absent a stated policy to that effect." Id.
202. Id.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060.
204. West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 52, 720 P.2d 782, 785-
86 (1986) (West Main I).
205. See Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. App. 755, 761, 745
P.2d 1328, 1331 (1987).
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to vested rights and zoning situations." Due process requires
that governments treat citizens in a fundamentally fair man-
ner. ° This promotes the goal of the vested rights doctrine to
protect citizens from the fluctuating policies of the government
so that they can exercise their "constitutional right to develop
property" with reasonable certainty.2 w The land use ordinance
must aim at a legitimate public purpose and the means used to
achieve that purpose must be reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive to individuals.' To the extent that SEPA
policies are viewed as land use ordinances, 10 this same analysis
could apply to the content of local agency SEPA policies.
In recent substantive SEPA decisions, however, there is
little evidence of any increased willingness of courts to listen
to substantive due process arguments. Substantive due process
analysis has not yet been applied in any substantive SEPA
case.
VIII. SUGGESTED LIMITATIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE SEPA
The central tension in the substantive SEPA cases is
between the policies of the vested rights doctrine to protect
landowners and the need for local governments to retain flexi-
bility in environmental decision-making.
The property developer operating under SEPA wants to be
able to plan development with reasonable certainty and to be
able to make profitable use of his or her property. Fundamen-
tal fairness requires that the property owner be protected from
the hazard of abusive and arbitrary government regulation and
the fluctuating policies of the legislature.211 Local govern-
ments have a duty to provide land owners and developers with
reasonable certainty so that they can plan the use of their
property. 2
On the other hand, local governments need the authority
206. See Valley View Industrial v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182
(1987); West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782; Norco Constr. v. King County, 97
Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
207. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 636, 733 P.2d at 191; West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d
at 51, 720 P.2d at 785.
208. West Main I, 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785.
209. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 636, 733 P.2d at 191; West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d
at 51, 720 P.2d at 785; Norco, 97 Wash. 2d at 685, 649 P.2d at 106.
210. See Victoria Tower, 49 Wash. App. at 761, 745 P.2d at 1331.
211. West Main I, 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785; Polygon Corp. v. City of
Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 69, 578 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1978).
212. E.g., West Main I, 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785.
[Vol. 14:143
Washington's Environmental Policy Act
to respond to site-specific proposals and to tailor their approv-
als to changing environmental conditions and values. This is
supported by the legislative policy embodied in SEPA that
requires full consideration of environmental values.213 Local
governments value predictability, but also desire flexibility in
substantive SEPA decisions because of the permissive vested
rights doctrine of Washington.
Substantive SEPA acts as a safety valve for this vested
rights doctrine-to protect the environment from our lack of
foresight. Local regulators would have to be omniscient in
order to provide developers with absolute certainty. It follows,
therefore, that a change in doctrine should be adopted if it can
provide more certainty and protection for developers and still
retain sufficient flexibility for local governments to respond to
the unforeseen environmental effects of specific proposals.
A. Vest Rights in SEPA Policies at Earlier Date
Vesting developers' rights in local agency SEPA policies at
the date of permit application would provide more certainty
for developers without diminishing the flexibility needed by
local governments. Under current SEPA Rules, policies must
be in place at the time of DNS or DEIS issuance.214 This rule
is offensive to the goals of the vested rights doctrine, because it
allows local governments to change their environmental deci-
sion-making criteria after permit application.215 There may be
a gap of several years between permit or plat application and
the DNS or DEIS issuance.1 6 Vesting of rights in SEPA poli-
cies at the date of permit or plat application would provide
more predictability to developers and more protection from
arbitrary regulation. The flexibility of local governments
would still be protected by broad, general SEPA policies that
can be used to deny or condition proposals.
213. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.020 and .030; Stempel v. Dept. of Water
Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 117, 508 P.2d 166, 171 (1973).
214. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-660; see Victoria Tower Partnership v. City of
Seattle, 49 Wash. App. 755, 745 P.2d 1320 (1987).
215. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 743-45,
765 P.2d 264, 265-66 (1988) (The length of time between plat application and DEIS
issuance in Cougar Mountain was 3 years and 2 months.)
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B. Incorporate Environmental Concerns
Into Regulatory Codes
A second suggestion is to encourage local governments to
incorporate environmental concerns into regulatory land use
codes to the extent feasible. There is already a significant
trend in this direction.217 Neither local governments nor devel-
opers like time-consuming negotiation and expensive litigation.
Therefore, this is a promising solution for those environmental
impacts that are reasonably predictable, such as increased traf-
fic and its attendant pollution. In such predictable impact
areas, developers gain more certainty, and local governments
give up no flexibility. Again, local government flexibility is
still protected from unforeseen impacts by the existence of
broad, general local agency SEPA policies.
C Restrict Content of Local Agency SEPA Policies
A more ambitious suggestion is to judicially or legislatively
limit the allowable content of local agency SEPA policies.
Comprehensive land use regulations that categorically regulate
all properties of a certain kind or in a certain area should not
be allowed as SEPA policies. Local agencies should only be
allowed to adopt SEPA policies that are environmental stan-
dards related to an ad hoc determination of a specific propo-
sal's environmental impacts. SEPA policies must be
performance standards rather than inflexible rules. These
standards need not be precisely quantifiable, but they must
establish standards by which the specific environmental
impacts of a proposal can be measured.
Many local governments have taken the "kitchen sink"
approach to the adoption of SEPA policies. They have adopted
by reference the whole of their zoning codes, comprehensive
plans, shoreline management master plans, and so forth as
local agency SEPA policies.21 This seems to be largely a mat-
ter of convenience. It is impossible to believe that every sec-
tion of a land use code or comprehensive plan thus adopted is
217. See McLerran, Substantive SEPA: What is the Practice and What are the
Limits, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW Mm-YEA , Wash. State Bar Assoc. at
4A-5 (1987).
218. E.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 20.44.080. King County has adopted as
local agency SEPA policies the whole of the King County Zoning Code, the whole of
the King County Comprehensive Plan, the King County Agricultural Lands Policy,
the King County Landmarks Preservation Code, the King County Shoreline
Management Master Plan, etc.
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intended as an environmental policy to guide agency determi-
nations on the significance of the impacts of any specific propo-
sal. Courts should take this into account when interpreting
these local agency policy statutes and not allow local govern-
ment reliance on categorical regulations.
This suggestion is based on the idea that the environmen-
tal determinations of SEPA should be uniquely related to the
specific environmental impacts of the proposal in question. 9
For example, a comprehensive plan provision that prescribes
one dwelling unit per every five acres, no matter the specific
impacts of the proposed dwelling units, should not be a valid
SEPA policy.? On the other hand, a provision that projects
should not be excessive in bulk or scale would be a valid stan-
dard that a local decision-maker could use to assess the specific
impacts of a particular proposal. Categorical regulations do not
respond to the impacts of a particular plan on a particular site.
This suggestion is supported by language in Washington
case law that SEPA policies are not a substitute for zoning but
provide general guidance for determining whether environ-
mental impacts of an otherwise acceptable project require
denial. 1 Categorical regulations do not give general guidance
for a specific decision. Rather, they give specific prescriptions
for a class of decisions, and should not be allowed as local
agency SEPA policies.
Washington opinions hold that stringent procedural safe-
guards are necessary because environmental considerations are
not amenable to precise quantification.' Thus, if an environ-
mental consideration is so precisely foreseeable and quantifi-
able that it may be expressed in a comprehensive regulation,
then it is not needed as a SEPA policy. The purpose of SEPA
is to protect from lack of foresight, not to comprehensively
regulate.
The rationale of the recent land use cases which invoke
substantive due process also supports this suggestion.' A
219. See Dep't of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d 656, 667, 601
P.2d 494, 499 (1979); Polygon Corp. v. City Qf Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 65-66, 578 P.2d
1309, 1313 (1978).
220. A similar provision of the King County Comprehensive Plan was relied on by
the King County Council in Cougar Mountain. Cougar Mountain, 111 Wash. 2d at 756,
765 P.2d at 272.
221. See, eg., West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 525, 742
P.2d 1266, 1273 (1987), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1989) (West Main II).
222. See, eg., Polygon, 90 Wash. 2d at 69, 578 P.2d at 1315.
223. See Valley View Industrial Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733
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comprehensive regulation is not reasonably related to a partic-
ularistic investigation of the specific impacts of a specific pro-
ject. This lack of a reasonable relation between the SEPA
policy and the specific proposal's impacts is one interpretation
of the court's rationale in Prisk v. City of Poulsbo.' That deci-
sion can be read to say that a "policy" calling for a flat fee per
dwelling unit, applicable to all dwelling units no matter the
specific environmental consequences of a particular proposal, is
not reasonably related to the specific impacts of a specific
proposal.
Implementation of this suggestion, either judicially or leg-
islatively, would not detract from the flexibility of local gov-
ernments because they would still be able to adopt general
performance standards to deal with unforeseen situations. It
also would have the virtue of giving greater certainty to land-
owners because the potential conflicting policies would be
reduced.
XV. CONCLUSION
The scope of substantive SEPA authority is currently lim-
ited primarily by the clearly erroneous standard of review and
by the procedural restrictions set out in the Cougar Mountain
decision.
The clearly erroneous standard of review does away with
the presumption of validity that is usual for agency actions.
The court will examine all the evidence in light of the public
policies of SEPA. Courts will look carefully at SEPA denials
in order to insure that the denial was a responsible exercise of
power and that there has been no overreaching by local
governments.
The primacy of the procedural safeguards of SEPA as a
protection against local government abuse was reaffirmed by
Cougar Mountain. Courts will inquire closely into the ade-
quacy of required written agency findings and conclusions.
While there is a rigid lack of discretion for local govern-
ments in procedural requirements, the West Main II decision
shows that there is significant discretion in actual substantive
decisions. As yet there are no meaningful limitations on the
P.2d 182 (1987); West Main 1, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (1986); Norco Construction
v. King County, 97 WasL 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
224. 46 Wash. App. 793, 732 P.2d 1013; see supra notes 204-10 and accompanying
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content or specificity of local SEPA policies. Broad standards
are sufficient if procedural safeguards are met. Even compre-
hensive plans may currently be adopted and used as local
SEPA policies.
Flexibility of local governments may be maintained and
more certainty for land owners could be achieved by vesting
developers' rights under local SEPA policies at the time of per-
mit application and by incorporating more environmental con-
cerns into regulatory land use codes. In addition, either the
courts or the legislature should limit local governments in the
kinds of local SEPA policies that they are allowed to adopt.
Comprehensive land use regulations should not be allowed as
SEPA policies. Rather, only environmental standards that
relate to a specific project's environmental impacts should be
allowed.
Roger Pearce
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